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THE FELLOW SERVANT RULE IN NEW YORKW
ARON STEUERt
T HE fellow servant rule is the museum piece of the regulations and
AL provisions which have governed the determination of personal
injury cases in New York. Its origin is unique, its history is replete
with odd controversies and its present influence is almost directly
contrary to the purposes it was introduced to perform. Put baldly,
the rule is one of defense in an action for injuries by an employee
against his employer and it provides that if injuries or death- are oc-
casioned by the negligence of a fellow servant of the plaintiff there can
be no recovery.
In New York the rule has no background, no origin of analogy or
logical extension from any existing precept. It was not born into
our law, it was adopted, full grown, from the law of Massachusetts
where it had established itself. It is more than a coincidence that the
period of the spread of the rule is the period of the early development
of the railroads. The latter were the advocates of the rule and it may
well be that it had an important effect in preventing serious financial
injury at a time when the carriers could ill afford it. The rule was by
no means confined to the railroads but extends to every form of em-
ployment including domestic service.4
An examination of the extent of the rule as limited by the holdings
is in order. Recovery is barred if the injury is due to the negligence
of any other employee of the defendant regardless of whether the of-
fending employee is hired in an altogether different capacity, or is en-
gaged in a different enterprise,' or does a kind of work entirely different
from the services performed by the plaintiff.7 Conversely it may be
noted that the rule does not apply where the negligent employee is hired
by another even though that other is a subcontractor of plaintiff's em-
t Justice, New York Supreme Court.
1. This is the third of a series of studies in personal injury cases in New York. The
first The Conception of Duty appeared in (1932) 18 CoRar. L. Q. 51; the second The
Action for Wrongful Death appeared in (1935) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rrv. 388.
2. Sherman v. The Rochester & Syracuse R.R., 17 N. Y. 153 (1858), aFg 15 Barb.
574 (1853).
3. Coon v. Syracuse & Utica R.R., 5 N. Y. 492 (1851).
4. Erjauschek v. Kramer, 141 App. Div. 545, 126 N. Y. Supp. 289 (1st Dcp't 1910).
S. Belt v. DuBois' Sons Co., 97 App. Div. 392, 89 N. Y. Supp. 1072 (2d Dep't 1904).
6. Wright v. New York Central R.R., 28 Barb. 80 (N. Y. 1858), rev'd, 2S N. Y. 562
(1862); Rich v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 112 App. Div. 818, 98 N. Y. Supp. 678 (4th
Dep't 1906); Miller v. American Sugar Refining Co., 138 App. Div. 512, 23 N. Y. Supp.
30 (2d Dep't 1910).
7. Pickett v. Atlas Steamship Co. Ltd., 12 Daly 441 (N. Y. 1884).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ployer8 or is a licensee working on his property. The test of employ-
ment used is the right of hiring and discharging.10 The respective posi-
tions as regards authority between the plaintiff and the negligent em-
ployee does not alter the situation., Even if the injury results from
the direct orders of a foreman which are improperly given,12 or from
the negligent directions of one charged with transmitting them, there
can be no recovery." The rule applies to all times while the plaintiff
is at work, and, if he is allowed to travel to and from work on company
trains, it applies to injuries received on these trips.14 The same is true
of employees who walk to and from work on the company property 1
The mere reading of these rules shows that an employee faced a veri-
table impasse in a suit against his employer. If there was negligence
other than his own for which the employer could be responsible it must
have in the nature of things been that of a fellow employee." There
are two possible exceptions to this-the employer must provide a safe
place to work, which includes safe materials to work with, and he must
use due care to employ skillful workmen. 7 But these requirements,
while sensible if applied to an individual employer, are subject to logical
infirmities when applied to a corporation. A corporation hires em-
ployees and provides and maintains equipment through employees. For
the negligence of these employees it is not responsible for they must
a fortiori be fellow servants of the injured. Of course, if the hiring is
done by the board of directors as a corporate act, that would probably
not be an act of a fellow employee, but employees so hired are seldom
the provokers of negligent injuries. It is not surprising to note that
a lack of sufficient workers was held to be the negligence of the em-
ployee charged with the duty of hiring. 8 As regards the other branch--
equipment and a place to work-conclusions were reached only after
some difficulty. If the place is safe in itself, and only becomes dangerous
through the carelessness of fellow employees, the results were not ac-
tionable.' And this was adhered to even if the negligence was a failure
8. Young v. New York Central R.R., 30 Barb. 229 (N. Y. 1859).
9. Smith v. New York & Harlem R.R., 6 Duerr. 225 (1856), aff'd, 19 N. Y. 127 (1859).
10. Murray v. Dwight, 15 App. Div. 241, 44 N. Y. Supp. 234 (3rd Dep't 1897),
aff'd, 161 N. Y. 301 (1900).
11. Gabrielson v. Waydell, 135 N. Y. 1 (1892).
12. Keenan et al. v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R.R., 145 N. Y. 190 (1895).
13. Dana v. New York Central & H. R. R.R., 23 Hun 473 (4th Dep't 1881).
14. Russell v. The Hudson River R.R., 17 N. Y. 134 (1858), rev'g, 5 Duerr. 39
(1855); Vicks v. New York Central & H. R. R.R., 95 N. Y. 267 (1884).
15. Boldt v. The New York Central R.R., 18 N. Y. 432 (1858).
16. Karl v. Maillard, 3 Bosw. 591 (N. Y. 1858).
17. Perkins v. New York Central R.R., 24 N. Y. 196, 220 (1862). See dissenting
opinion of Smith, J.
18. Flike v. Boston & Albany R.R., 53 N. Y. 549 (1873).
19. Hale v. Wayside Knitting Co., 59 App. Div. 395, 69 N. Y. Supp. 404 (3rd Dep't 1901).
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to inspect the premises to discover defects.20 On the matter of equip-
ment, the ultimate determination was quite contrary to the previous
conclusions. A workman given poor tools was not required to overcome
the defect, even though he might have done so with the use of reasonable
skill; and if such a one injured a fellow employee, the common em-
ployer was responsible.21 And it was later determined (in a case involv-
ing equipment) that the duty to inspect is not delegable and the em-
ployer is responsible for its failure, even though this may actually result
from an employee's negligence.22
The fellow servant rule has been extensively rationalized. When the
origin of the rule is understood it must be seen that the defense amounts
to a legal axiom,a and there is neither possibility of explanation nor
necessity for it. Yet it has been attempted not without some nicety
of understanding. It has been argued that the relationship of the three
persons involved (employer, negligent employee, injured employee) is
one which creates no obligation of respondeat superior. Comparison was
made to the situation where the recipient of charity is injured by the
donor's employee and it was pointed out that in both situations it was
the relationship which relieved the defendant rather than any public
policy. 4 This is an explanation of the rule which, had it been intended
by the early court which introduced the rule, would have been a better
reason, or at least a more logical one than that which in fact prompted
adoption of the rule. Another reason for the rule was advanced only
to be shown lacking when subjected to the test of general application.
It was claimed that the injured employee was familiar with the habits
and activities of his associate employees and hence assumed the risk of
their conduct. When the rule was applied to employers having depart-
ments of widely divergent activity, whose employees had no association
or knowledge of each other, and an employee in one branch was unable
to recover for the negligence of one in another branch who was an actual
stranger in fact and in method of work, this reason was seen not to
be the true cause of the rule.2
20. Warner v. Erie Railway Co., 39 N. Y. 468 (1868); Faulkner v. Erie Ry., 49
Barb. 324 (N. Y. 1867).
21. Cone v. Delaware L. & W. R.R., 81 N. Y. 206 (1880), a17'g, 1S Hun 172 (1878).
22. McKnight v. Brooklyn Heights Ry., 23 Misc. 527, 51 N. Y. Supp. 738 (Sup. CL
1898).
23. The rule has been so treated, or at least its existence has been used, as a premise
from which to argue other propositions. See dissenting opinion of Allen, J., in Smith
v. New York Central R.R., 24 N. Y. 222, 240 (1862), where it was argued that the
recognition of the rule shows that there is no public policy which prevents a peron
from contracting against the effects of his own negligence.
24. Wallace v. John A. Casey Co., 132 App. Div. 35, 116 N. Y. Supp. 394 (2nd Dep't
1909).
25. Ross. v. New York Central & H. R. R.R., 5 Hun 488 (4th Dep't 1875), a'd, 74
N. Y. 617 (1878).
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The enactment of the Employers Liability Act was a death blow to
the fellow servant rule. The exclusion of the rule as a defense by the
Workmen's Compensation Act virtually concluded the active history of
the rule in New York. Thereafter its importance lay in the propositions
it had fostered and left as a heritage to the solution of cases dealing
with injury. An examination of these will reveal the startling fact that
without exception they have inured to the benefit of the injured em-
ployee, or at least against the employer. By virtue of the decisions
that railroad employees riding free to and from work were then engaged
in their employer's business, the same was for a time held in Work-
men's Compensation cases and the employees injured under these cir-
cumstances could recover under that statute.2  The employer is, by vir-
tue of the same decisions, liable to third persons for his employee's
acts after the latter's working hours if he is still on the employer's
premises and subject to his general direction.27 Other examples can
be cited. It is interesting to note that a rule affecting admissibility of
evidence formulated in one of the early fellow servant cases has been
applied since, where appropriate in negligence actions, and in every
recorded instance that has been discovered it has operated to defeat
the contentions of the defendant.28
To evaluate the fellow servant rule is impossible. It did harm or good
depending on one's attitude to the right of recovery in personal injury
actions. It has neither more nor less logic to support it than the doc-
trine of respondeat superior, to which it is an exception with no par-
ticular reason for the existence of the exception. Whether the fellow
servant rule fitted in with the pattern of our law is again a question
directed to individual attitude, very nearly resembling a question of
taste and so not subject to discussion. Even in the absence of a phil-
osophy regarding the rule its history may prove of interest.
26. Kowalek v. N. Y. Consolidated R.R. Co., 190 App. Div. 160, 179 N. Y. Supp.
637 (3rd Dep't 1919), rev'd, 229 N. Y. 489 (1920).
27. McKeon v. Manze, 157 N. Y. Supp. 623 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
28. Downs v. New York Central R.R., 47 N. Y. 83 (1871), aff'd, 56 N. Y. 664 (1874);
Pardo v. Sender Brothers Trucking Co., Inc., 144 Misc. 68, 257 N. Y. Supp. 798 (Sup.
Ct. 1932); Hodas v. Davis, 203 App. Div. 297, 196 N. Y. Supp. 801 (3rd Dep't 1922)
(though here the admission of the evidence was held immaterial error and the defendant's
victory was not disturbed).
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